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THE EVOLUTION OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
RELATIONSHIP IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: 
NEW YORK CITY'S CHANGING 
SEVEN-YEAR HISTORY 
Ida Klaus* 
I. EARLY FORCES 
T HE bargaining relationship between the New York City Board of Education and its teachers had its roots in the social 
forces of the mid-fifties and its formal origins in the events of the 
early sixties. The relationship came about without benefit of law or 
executive policy. No law permitting public employees to bargain col-
lectively was in effect anywhere in those years, and Mayor Wagner's 
1958 Executive Order-the culmination of three years of study and 
public inquiry-did not apply to teachers.1 Instead, the impetus 
came directly from the persistent and increasingly powerful drive of 
the teachers themselves. They demanded a substantial voice 
in the determination of their salaries and, through improvement 
of their working conditions, enhancement of their stature as profes-
sionals. Ignoring the prohibitions of state law, they chose the strike 
as their pressure technique.2 Two work stoppages3 in the 1959-60 
• Director of Staff Relations, New York City Board of Education. A.B. 1927, Hunter 
College; L.L.B. 1931, Columbia University.-Ed. 
I. Executive Order on City Employee Relations (March 1958). This order covers 
only those city employees who were under the direct control of the Mayor. It estab-
lished for those employees a system of labor relations similar in many fundamental 
respects to that prevailing under federal and state law for private workers. Although 
Board of Education employees were not among those who would be covered by the 
Mayor's program, two organizations representing New York City teachers nevertheless 
participated in the public hearings which led to the adoption of the order. The one, 
representing only high school teachers and since defunct, stressed the separate pro-
fessional, rather than trade-union, interest of teachers. The other, since merged into 
the present dominant United Federation of Teachers, expressed the hope that the 
hearings would point the way to effective collective bargaining for all nonsupervisory 
pedagogical employees in a single unit. See I. Klaus, Report on a Program of Labor 
Relations for New York City Employees (New York City Department of Labor, June 
1957). 
2. The so-called Condon-Wadlin Law, Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. 
Laws 842, as amended, Law of April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 
1967), adopted in 1947 as a part of the Civil Service Law, banned all strikes by public 
employees and imposed severe penalties upon individual workers for engaging in the 
proscribed conduct. The Governor's message accompanying his approval of the 
measure declared the philosophy underlying the legislation to be that the public ser-
vice, in all its aspects, is "a public trust in behalf of all the people" and that "a 
trustee cannot strike or falter in the performance of his duties." 
3. The first strike, which lasted for about three and a half weeks in February 
1959, was limited to evening high school teachers who sought an increase in their 
rates of pay. 
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period signaled three important facts: (1) that the teachers were 
grimly serious about obtaining improvements in their welfare; (2) 
that they were strongly determined to achieve those improvements 
through collective bargaining by a duly chosen representative; and 
(3) that they would not tolerate further vague promises and tactical 
delays by the City Board of Education. 
A. Basic Attitudes and First Steps 
In 1961, a newly constituted and appointed New York City 
School Board gave highest priority to meeting the teachers' requests. 
Within a few months, the new Board had declared a clear policy of 
exclusive recognition for collective bargaining purposes; had im-
plemented that policy by formal hearing and election procedures; 
had overcome earlier obstacles to determining appropriate bargain-
ing units, voting eligiblity requirements, and qualifications for or-
ganization part1c1pation; and had recognized the employees' 
majority choice, the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, Amer-
ican Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO,4 as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of all classroom teachers. 5 
The second strike was called on November 7, 1960, by the American Federation of 
Teachers affiliate and predecessor of the present United Federation of Teachers. It 
sought to obtain for the teachers' representatives some form of recognition in dealing 
with the Board on salaries and on the improvement of working conditions. The strike 
was terminated after one day when a three-man panel of prominent labor leaders was 
appointed to inquire into the basic causes of the strike and the areas of teacher dis-
satisfaction. Thereafter, the panel was to make recommendations for the improvement 
of teacher-Board relations. The panel recommended a policy and program for the rec-
ognition and participation of teacher organizations. For months thereafter, the Board 
refused to declare and implement an unequivocal policy. Instead, it sought by various 
means to ascertain preliminarily the sentiments of its teachers and other pedagogical 
employees. Finally, in June 1961, it formulated a proposed policy for collective bargain• 
ing founded upon exclusive recognition of a bargaining agent chosen by the 
majority of employees. The policy was to become operative, however, only if it 
were established in a referendum that a majority of employees actually wished 
to have collective bargaining. Over 70 per cent of those participating in the pre-
liminary referendum voted in favor of collective bargaining as defined by the Board. 
See 1962-1963 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New York 
and United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Classroom Teachers (signed 
Oct. 18, 1962) (a copy of this agreement is on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
4. This organization is referred to hereinafter as the Union, the United Federation 
of Teachers, or the UFT. 
5. The Board members turned the resolution of the representation question and 
all related matters over to the City Department of Labor. The two most difficult 
issues which had blocked a rational and expeditious application of the new policy in 
favor of exclusive recognition were the designation of an appropriate unit and the 
qualification of contending organizations to represent employees for bargaining. A 
system-wide unit of classroom teachers was found most conducive to the prompt and 
effective institution of collective bargaining. Contending organizations were deemed 
qualified if they met three basic tests: (1) nondiscriminatory admission to member• 
ship; (2) capacity to act as a collective bargaining representative for all employees 
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Then, early in 1962, the Board of Education and the Union took 
the first steps toward establishing what is now probably the most 
advanced and critical collective bargaining relationship anywhere 
in public education, if not in the public service generally. The re-
lationship-and especially the collective bargaining agreements by 
which it has been governed-have served as the model for school 
districts and other teacher groups.6 Most teacher-board agreements 
in other large cities which are executed as the result of negotia-
tions are plainly molded in the image of the basic New York City 
parent agreement. 7 
The New York City relationship was founded as much on the 
solid commitment of the Board of Education to the conceptual and 
practical responsibilities of collective bargaining as it was on the firm 
dedication of the teacher leadership to the correspondingly full har-
vest of substantive and procedural advantages which collective bar-
gaining was expected to bring. Thus, each side entered upon this 
novel joint endeavor with its own understanding of how both would 
work together to fashion a new employee-relations "constitution" to 
govern the special public enterprise of which they were a part. It is 
hard to say whether either party foresaw at that time how the dy-
namics of the continuing relationship and the shadows already cast 
by oncoming social changes would expand the framework of the 
"constitution" and foster the emergence of a solid "common law" of 
the enterprise. 
Trial, conflict, and combat-resolved in the end by a basic deter-
mination on both sides to make the joint venture work-have 
involved; and (3) capacity and disposition to represent equally all within the unit. 
A mail-ballot election among the then approximately 40,000 teachers in the unit re• 
suited in a majority vote for the United Federation of Teachers as against two other 
organizations and a "none" choice. For a more detailed account of the technical as-
pects of the resolution of the preliminary issues, see 1963 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERI· 
CAN BAR AssocIAnON, SEcnON OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON LAw OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE REI.AnoNS. 
6. Upon the conclusion of the second agreement in 1963, the American Federation of 
Teachers prepared and distributed in other areas of the country a special bulletin entitled 
Collective Bargaining for Teachers-the New York City Contract. The bulletin 
pointed out the highlights of the new agreement and noted: "Teachers everywhere 
are studying the contract in expectation of future advancement in their own school 
districts." 
7. The model has been followed by both American Federation of Teachers and 
National Education Association affiliates. See, e.g., contracts in Detroit, Boston, Phil-
adelphia (all American Federation of Teachers affiliates) and Newark, New Jersey, and 
New Haven, Connecticut (the former a National Education Association constituent 
and the latter a National Education Association constituent for a time). While the 
substance of the New York City agreement has not yet been borrowed by other 
countries, a possible first known step in that direction has been taken in Japan where 
one of the early New York agreements has been translated into Japanese. 
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marked the seven-year history of the relationship and shaped the 
characteristics it has assumed in the process of continuing growth 
and cautious adjustment. For the teachers, this seven-year history has 
been a story of how from the beginning they won important psychic 
and economic gains, and found new professional freedoms and secu-
rity. For the Union, it has been a series of encounters in the teachers' 
behalf along the road to tremendous power in the administration of 
the school system. For the Board and the administrators, it has been 
an account of how they met new challenges to established concepts 
and practices in the governance of the schools, and how they re-
shaped attitudes in the conduct of their relations with teachers. For 
the community, it has provided not merely a perennial source of 
anxiety about whether and when the schools would open, but also 
an impetus toward asserting its own separate interests in the out-
come of the bargaining. 
B. The Growing Process and the Stages of Evolution 
The teacher-board relationship developed through three distinct 
but interrelated processes: (I) joint negotiation at the bargaining 
table by which the basic terms and conditions of teacher service are 
determined and then reduced to a written collective bargaining agree-
ment; (2) actual day-to-day application and administration at the 
school (and other) levels of the terms and conditions agreed upon; 
and (3) active consultation between appropriate representatives of 
both sides on matters of mutual concern which are either not 
properly within the scope of collective bargaining, or are not suscep-
tible to appropriate adjustment at the bargaining table, or should 
not be deferred for consideration until the opening of formal periodic 
negotiations. This Article deals primarily with the first process. But 
where important, it also attempts to show the interaction of all three. 
The New York City Board of Education has negotiated four 
classroom teacher agreements: 8 the first in 1962,9 for a one-year term 
commencing July 1, 1962; the second in 1963,10 for a two-year term 
beginning on July 1, 1963; the third in 1965, covering a two-year 
8. In addition to the agreements covering classroom teachers, the AFL-CIO has 
also entered into agreements with the board covering school secretaries, psychologists 
and social workers, laboratory assistants and laboratory technicians, day school coun-
selors and per session counselors, auxiliary teachers (bi-lingual teachers), and at-
tendance teachers. 
9. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3. 
10. 1963-1965 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New 
York and United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Classroom Teachers 
(signed Feb. 10, 1964) (a copy of this agreement is on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). 
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period starting on July 1, 1965;11 and the fourth and current one12 
for a twenty-six-month period commencing July l, 1967, and ending 
with the beginning of the next school year in September 1969. Each 
agreement has built upon and expanded its predecessor. Each agree-
ment, and the negotiations from which it emerged, marks a distinct 
and progressive stage in the evolution of the Board-Union relation-
ship. As original documentary sources, the four agreements them-
selves provide much internal evidence of the organic growth of the 
relationship. However, the agreements alone do not reflect the com-
plete history out of which they arose. The form, the style, and the 
content of these documents have their origins in external surround-
ing circumstances which serve to illuminate the writings and, hence, 
the relationship itself. 
II. THE FmsT STAGE: EXPLORATION AND EXPERIMENTATION 
The first stage in the relationship, which commenced early in 
1962, consisted of the initial encounter between School Board and 
Union, the course of the negotiations benveen them, and the emer-
gence of the first agreement. Although far from amateurs, both the 
Board as employer and the Union as agent for the teachers entered 
upon their respective responsibilities in a relatively simple and com-
paratively primitive way. Almost immediately after a formal cere-
mony in which the Board officially recognized the Union's status as 
the exclusive bargaining representative for all of New York's then 
43,000 public school teachers, the UFT presented some 160 demands 
to the Superintendent of Schools. At that point, the Board was faced 
with the hard realities of translating into practice the theory of its 
new policy. What were the basic mechanics and the guiding sub-
stantive principles for the initiation and conduct of a bargaining re-
lationship in public education? Other spheres of public employment 
offered little, if any, guidance. It was a matter of breaking new 
ground-as much for the Union as for the Board. A number of Board 
members were well acquainted with the process and the institution 
of collective bargaining in the world of industry. The UFT, indeed, 
drew considerable advice and assistance from the trade union move-
11. 1965-1967 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New 
York and the United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Day School, Class-
room Teachers and Per Session Teachers (signed Nov. 24, 1965) (a copy of this agree-
ment is on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
12. 1967-1969 Agreement Between The Board of Education of the City of New 
York and United Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Covering Day School, Classroom 
Teachers and Per Session Teachers (signed Dec. 6, 1967) (a copy of this agreement is 
on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
1038 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1033 
ment of which it was a part. Hence, both sides set about adapting 
established private-sector concepts to the peculiar characteristics of 
this special public enterprise; the process of accommodation was a 
pragmatic one of informed improvisation. On the Board's side, the 
heaviest burden fell first on the Superintendent and then on the 
nine Board members, all of whom became personally involved in the 
negotiations. 
The most important issue was, of course, salary. On this subject, 
Board members met with the Union committee far into the night 
in numerous negotiating sessions. A significant difference between 
government and private industry brought on an early disagree-
ment about the timing of the salary negotiations in relation to 
the budget-making process.13 The final allocation of funds to the 
Board for the next fiscal year had not yet been made when the nego-
tiations began. The Board nevertheless felt that it could proceed to 
discuss salaries and other monetary items within the framework of 
realistic estimates of future income based on experience. The Union 
disagreed. It regarded negotiations under circumstances short of fis-
cal certainty as a mere game which gave little promise that the chips 
would ever be cashed in. Nevertheless, the bargaining on salaries 
proceeded, moving into high gear after the Mayor advised the Board 
of its operating budget for the following school year. The Union 
thereupon insisted on a substantial upward revision of the salary 
schedules, and the Board offered what it felt it could afford to 
pay within the limitations of its budget and of anticipated addi-
tional funds. The stalemate brought on a one-day strike that closed 
most New York City schools. The Union terminated the work stop-
page in obedience to a court injunction and decision which declared 
the strike illegal under the state's so-called Condon-Wadlin Law.14 
Following the strike, the parties agreed on a very favorable salary 
structure after the Governor discovered that he could make addi-
tional state funds available to the Board for that year.15 
Other teacher demands for long-awaited improvements in work-
ing conditions presented the challenge of how to accommodate col-
13. For a discussion of this and other aspects of the special problems connected 
with public sector bargaining, see Address by Ida Klaus, The Emerging Relationship, 
Conference on Public Employment and Collective Bargaining, University of Chicago, 
Feb. 5, 1965. See also Rehmus, Constraints on Local Government and Public Employee 
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 919 (1969). 
14. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of 
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). This was the only occa-
sion on which the Union was to heed a court directive forbidding a strike. 
15. The Union, which claimed credit for unearthing the Governor's cache, evinced 
an early talent for the game of the political treasure hunt in public employment 
negotiations. 
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lective bargaining to the Board's internal budget-making responsi-
bility. That responsibility required the Board, once monies were 
made available to it for the ensuing fiscal year, to adopt its own in-
ternal operating budget for the year by allocating specific funds 
for designated school-system purposes. Among other important 
benefits, the Union sought during the first year of bargaining a re-
duced teaching schedule for teachers in the elementary and junior 
high schools, relief from unpleasant custodial and monitorial tasks 
known as "nonteaching chores," and a daily duty-free lunch period 
in the elementary schools. The Board acknowledged both the need 
for these changes and its willingness to bring them about. The prob-
lem was how to accomplish those objectives through the new mech-
anism of collective bargaining and at a cost which the Board could 
afford. The solution agreed upon was that both parties would jointly 
assume the burden of internal budgetary allotments within the limits 
of existing funds. The parties thus proceeded to negotiate a schedule 
of the amounts of money which the Board would spend on each de-
sired improvement. The scheduled amounts agreed upon as well as 
the new salary terms were embodied as separate budget items in a 
formal Board resolution adopted in June 1962, just before the com-
mencement of the next fiscal year. The resolution authorized the 
expenditure of stated sums of money for specified purposes to accom-
plish nine types of improvement in teacher working conditions. 
Three examples will illustrate how the parties subsequently trans-
lated the jointly negotiated budget into teacher benefits in the col-
lective bargaining agreement: (1) the budget authorized the sum of 
523,276 dollars to hire 116 additional teachers in order to accomplish 
a "Reduction of Teacher Instructional Load" in certain kinds of 
junior high schools from twenty-five to twenty-three or twenty-four 
periods per week;16 (2) it authorized the sum of 1,903,000 dollars to 
hire school aides in the elementary and high schools and, on a 
limited basis, in the junior high schools, "[t]o perform other than 
teaching chores now carried out by instructional staff";17 and (3) it 
authorized the sum of 1,831,466 dollars to hire 406 elementary school 
teachers in specialized areas in order "to make time available for 
relief of the classroom teacher, one ... period per week."18 When 
the parties drew up the first contract in September, they incorporated 
the items already specified in the budget resolution for the improve-
ment of working conditions into the collective bargaining agree-
16. See 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3, art. IV, § A(l). 
17. See id., art. IV, § A(3). 
18. See id., art. IV, § A(2). 
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ment as teacher benefits tied in amount to the budgetary allotments 
made in the resolution. For example: the collective bargaining agree-
ment provided for the reduction of teaching periods in certain junior 
high schools "to the extent permitted by" the June budget allotment 
for that purpose.19 Similarly, the Board undertook in the agreement 
to grant relief from nonteaching chores through implementation of 
"the budgetary item as to school aides" authorizing the hiring of 
nonteaching personnel to perform those tasks.2° Finally, the obliga-
tion to grant preparation periods in the elementary schools was tied 
to the amount of money made available in "the budgetary item as 
to increased specialized service."21 In this way the parties negotiated 
from knowledge of the amount of money available, and the Board 
was not committed to promoting improvements beyond its budgetary 
capacity. However, each individual teacher had no assurance of any 
specific benefit. 
Another aspect of the first bargaining experience was the formu-
lation of a grievance procedure. The parties agreed upon a very de-
tailed procedure which ended, for all grievances based on the appli-
cation or interpretation of the "working conditions" terms of the 
contract, with a carefully prescribed recourse to final arbitration by 
a neutral outsider chosen by both sides. Arbitration of this kind was 
at that time a bold and pioneer experiment in government;22 both 
sides were aware that they were breaking new ground. The Board 
was ready to defend the arbitration provision against the possible 
attack of illegal delegation of its authority. In return, it sought and 
obtained from the Union the inclusion of a broad no-strike clause in 
the agreement.23 The Union hailed the grievance procedure as the 
most significant aspect of the new relationship.24 It assured its mem-
19. Id. art. IV, § B(2)(b). 
20. Id. art. IV, § B(!l)(c). 
21. Id. art. IV, § B(3)(b). 
22. On the status of arbitration in government employment as of that time, see 
NEW YoRK CrrY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNRESOLVED DISPUTES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
(1955); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL 
SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 
18-19, 22-23 (1961). 
23. The provision, entitled "No-Strike Pledge," reads as follows: 
The Union and the Board recognize that strikes and other forms of work stop-
pages by teachers are contrary to law and public policy. The Union and the 
Board subscribe to the principle that differences shall be resolved by peaceful 
and appropriate means without interruption of the school program. The Union 
therefore agrees that there shall be no strikes, work stoppages, or other concerted 
refusal to perform work, by the employees covered by this agreement, nor any 
instigation thereof. 
1962-1963 Agreement, supra note !l, art. XIV. 
24. The October 1962 monthly bulletin of the United Federation of Teachers, 
UNITED AcrxoN, reported to its members: 
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bers, however, that "we have not renounced our right to take what-
ever action we deem to be the most effective in support of the nego-
tiations for a new contract when this contract expires."25 
Upon completion of the negotiations, all items of agreement 
were brought together into a single document in the form and style 
of a collective bargaining agreement26 covering thirty-eight printed 
pages. On October 18, 1962, the Union and the Board formally 
signed the agreement27-the first document of its kind in the history 
of public education. The Union framed the signed agreement and 
hung it on its headquarters wall to commemorate the genesis of the 
bargaining relationship and perhaps to symbolize the solemnity of its 
pledge to its members that "[f]rom this time on, a Union contract 
will be a condition and the basis under which we perform our pro-
fessional duties and set our professional standards."28 
III. THE SECOND STAGE: CRISIS AND TURNING POINT 
Negotiations for the second agreement started earnestly in Jan-
uary of 1963, about three months after the first agreement had been 
signed. The Union submitted salary proposals and demands for fur-
ther improvements in working conditions and changes in established 
practice. 
The first-round problems of accommodating the changes in work-
ing conditions to the Board's budget-making authority and financial 
ability assumed different proportions in the second stage. The nego-
tiations were now looking toward an agreement for a two-year term. 
The Union, moreover, was asking for definite commitments on sala-
ries and working conditions in each year-without conditioning 
their extent on the availability of funds. In other words, the teachers 
now wished to negotiate directly for improvements in their welfare. 
They wanted the substance of change and were leaving the financial 
means and budgetary consequences to the Board's ingenuity. As a 
result, the Board not only had to anticipate the amount of operating 
funds it might receive for the second year, but it was also faced with 
the necessity of obligating those future undetermined funds. Ability 
to pay thus remained a fundamental factor in the Board's negotiating 
The Grievance Procedure is the heart of the union contract. To most teachers, 
the effectiveness of the United Federation of Teachers will be judged by its 
ability to settle grievances. The grievance procedure reflects, more clearly than 
anything else, the great change made since the day when the Board made all the 
decisions; when the teacher was strictly at the mercy and whim of his principal. 
25. United Federation of Teachers, UNITED TEACHER, Oct. 1962. 
26. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3. 
27. The contract was for a term of one year, retroactive to July 1, 1962. 
28. United Federation of Teachers, UNITED TEACHER, Oct. 1962. 
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position. For example, on the question of additional nonteaching and 
preparation periods, the dispute centered on the Board's ability to 
provide a definite number of such periods. In the end, the parties 
reached a compromise: for the first year of the agreement the Board 
would provide the elementary school teachers with a specific number 
of preparation periods "to the extent possible" ;29 however, for the 
second year of the agreement the teachers had an outright guarantee 
of a given number of periods which was subject to the grievance 
procedure.30 In the junior high schools, the Board promised a definite 
number of periods during the first year and a further limited in-
crease in the second year "to the extent that funds are made avail-
able."81 
Although the parties remained far apart on the matter of salaries 
until the eleventh hour, they did not face the same tactical problems 
of synchronization with the budget-making process as they had met 
the year before. In order to obtain a two-year contract and to absorb 
most of the increased salary costs in the second year, the Board was 
prepared to take its chances that its estimates of future financial 
ability were accurate. If necessary, it would have to divert to salaries 
and other negotiated items funds that would otherwise be utilized 
for other educational needs and services.32 The result was a shift in 
the order of priorities. 33 
The main field of conflict during the second year concerned an 
extremely grave and difficult area in public education: the proper 
scope and boundaries of collective bargaining. Where is the line be-
tween what is primarily within the sphere of working conditions 
and hence subject to negotiation and bilateral decision, and what 
is essentially within the realm of educational policy and hence 
within the exclusive authority of the Board or the Superintendent 
29. 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. IV, § A(3)(b). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. art. IV, § A(2)(b). 
32. See Rehmus, supra note 13. 
33. The :Board in fact negotiated with the Union the order of priorities for the 
disbursement of the moneys that would be made available to the Board in its budget 
for the second year of the agreement. The arrangement read as follows: 
:BASIC FORMULATION OF SALARY INCREASE POLICY 
Expense budget funds made available to the :Board for the 1964-65 fiscal year will 
be allocated in the following order: First, funds will be allotted to continue pro-
grams and activities at the level in operation during 1963-64. Second, funds will 
be allotted for salary increases for the bargaining unit as stipulated in this agree• 
ment, and twice this amount will be allotted for derivative costs and increases as 
determined by the :Board and for other educational improvements. Third, any 
residual funds will then be allotted in the same proportion as provided in the 
preceding sentence. 
In the application of residual funds to teacher salary schedules priority will be 
given to equalizing steps and to increasing the promotional differential and then 
the first and second differentials. 
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and not subject to negotiation and agreement?34 The Union sought 
to extend collective bargaining to new aspects of educational ad-
ministration, and the Board rejoined that such matters were reserved 
exclusively to the discretionary professional judgment and policy-
making authority of the Board and of the Superintendent. The 
stalemate hardened on three principal issues. 
The first area of concern was the assignment of teachers to 
special classes and duties. The Union contended that all teachers 
should be presumed to be equally qualified for assignment to classes 
for the intellectually gifted and to certain special nonteaching posi-
tions (such as student guidance or counseling) carrying a lighter 
teaching load. It further maintained that the school's principal 
should have no discretion to make teacher selections on the basis of 
his judgment of relative qualifications; instead, assignments should 
be made only in accordance with seniority. To this, the Board an-
swered that qualifications were indeed relevant, and that their deter-
mination was within the exclusive domain of the principal. The 
Union replied that qualifications for special assignments should be 
negotiated and included in the agreement. 
Second, there was considerable debate about class size. The 
Union insisted on a commitment as to maximum class size based not 
on what was a reasonable working condition for teachers but rather 
on what produced the best learning conditions for children. That 
judgment, the Board maintained, was one of educational policy which 
was committed to the sole discretion of the Board and could not be 
negotiated. 
Third, the crucial question of improvement of "difficult" schools 
34. The issue was similar to, although the legal implications were different from, 
that presented by a proposal for a "management rights" clause in private industry 
negotiations. The first agreement between the Board and the teachers contained no 
so-called "management rights" clause. However, the area left open by law to the 
Board for negotiations had been indicated as follows by the Board in the preliminary 
referendum on collective bargaining conducted by the Board on June 12, 1961: 
Various governmental agencies have in recent years·voluntarily adopted modi-
fied forms of collective bargaining for government employees. These, because of 
the legal limitations and responsibilities placed upon governmental bodies, neces-
sarily differ in certain essential respects from industrial collective bargaining. 
In the case of the Board of Education, we are advised by counsel that such 
limitations would, under the present State laws, include the following: 
(a) As to certain subjects such as, for example, matters relating to hours, 
working conditions, holidays, vacations and allocation of funds within the total 
appropriated, the Board is advised that it has substantial powers. As to others, 
its powers are limited, particularly those calling for the appropriation of public 
funds, since it may make only recommendations of the total amount believed 
necessary for budgetary purposes. 
(b) As to those areas which, under law, are removed from the Board of Educa-
tion's power, the Board of Education may commit itself to recommending any 
agreed action to the appropriate public agencies. 
1044 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:IOllll 
was raised. Late in the course of the negotiations, the Union sub-
mitted as a basis for negotiation and agreement a plan for the "effec-
tive" organization and administration of schools in low-income areas. 
The plan called for experimental educational policies and instruc-
tional programs. Component features of the proposal included the 
selection of teachers, principals, and superintendents "with the advice 
and consent" of the Union, and joint faculty-supervisor administra-
tion of the pilot schools. The Superintendent of Schools charged 
publicly that the Union was attempting to take over the administra-
tion of the schools, and he refused even to discuss the matter 
with the Union. 
The clash over these issues led to the first serious breakdown in 
the teacher-Board relationship. Threats of strike were heard once 
more. This time the Union's leadership warned that, like freedom 
riders and other civil rights protesters, they would defy what they 
regarded as an unconstitutional state law prohibiting strikes by 
public employees.35 The seriousness of these issues to both sides de-
rived in large part from the Union's insistence that the desired 
changes be written into the collective bargaining agreement under 
the section on teacher "working conditions." In this way the changes 
would be subject to the full scope of the grievance procedure, in-
cluding arbitration. For the Board, this meant compounding its dele-
gation of authority to make educational policy-first, to the Union 
in the agreement, and then, possibly, to a third-party outsider. The 
Board was willing to enter into discussions with the Union on the 
questions of qualifications for teacher assignments and class size, but 
it reserved the right to make its own policy decisions on these sub-
jects. The Board did offer, however, to incorporate its final policy 
determinations in a superintendent's circular to be distributed to all 
the schools. Complaints of arbitrary departure from the policy 
prescribed in this circular would then be subject to the agency steps 
of the grievance procedure, but not to arbitration.36 
With the aid of a mediation panel, the Board and the Union fi-
35. The reference was to the modified Condon-Wadlin Law, passed in the 1963 
session of the State Legislature and to remain in effect until July I, 1965. Law of 
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, §§ I, 2, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432, amending Law of March 27, 
1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842 (repealed 1967). The principal changes made were 
a reduction in the tenure and promotion forfeitures imposed on individual employees 
for striking, the imposition of monetary fines for striking, and the strengthening of 
enforcement procedures. 
36. The term "grievance" was defined to cover two types of complaints: (I) "a viola-
tion, misinterpretation or inequitable application of any of the provisions of this 
agreement"; or (2) unfair or inequitable treatment "by reason of any act or condi• 
tion which is contrary to established policy or practice governing or affecting em-
ployees." 1965-1967 Agreement, supra note 11, art. VII, § A (emphasis added). Only 
the first type of complaint was subject to arbitration. 
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nally resolved the foregoing issues on the eve of the opening of 
school. The parties negotiated those elements of the basic demands 
which primarily concerned teacher working conditions and included 
them in the collective bargaining agreement. For example, the Board 
conceded that a class might be so large as to constitute an undue 
physical burden on a teacher. In that sense, class size could be re-
garded as a "working condition" subject to negotiation to determine 
the maximum number of pupils which a teacher could reasonably 
be required to handle.37 Since class-size limitations became part of the 
working conditions section of the contract, any claimed departure 
from those limitations was subject to all phases of the grievance pro-
cedure, including arbitration. On the other hand, teacher assignments 
and qualifications for assignments remained within the discretion of 
the school principals. Still, the parties devised special procedures to 
promote £air and objective selection of teachers for coveted non-
teaching assignments carrying a lower teaching load. Under these 
provisions, seniority was to be the controlling £actor only where 
qualifications, as determined by the principal, were equal. In order 
to preserve its discretionary and policy-making authority, the Board 
insisted that teacher programs and assignments be covered in a 
separate article of the contract entitled "Statement of Policy." This 
special article expressly provided that its provisions were deemed to 
be a part of "established policy and practice" within the meaning of 
the definition of "grievance."38 This meant that complaints of 
arbitrary or discriminatory application of the policy were subject to 
the agency steps of the grievance procedure-but not to arbitration. 
On questions of teacher recruitment and the improvement of dif-
ficult schools-essentially matters of school administration and edu-
cational policy-the Union ultimately demanded a medium for ex-
pressing the views of the majority of teachers, even if not through 
the normal channels of collective bargaining. The critical stalemate 
over that issue was resolved when the Board agreed to estab-
lish a system of periodic joint consultation-not negotiation-be-
37. For a description of the Union's strategy on its class-size negotiations and the 
meaning it placed upon the final outcome by the then director of organization for 
the United Federation of Teachers, see Selden, Class Size and the New York Contract, 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, March 1964, at 283. 
38. The Statement of Policy contained the following introduction: 
Following discussions with the Union, the Board, exercising its authority under 
the Education Law to manage and administer the school system, adopted the 
following policies, which are deemed to be a part of "established policy and prac-
tice" within the meaning of the definition of "grievance" contained in Section A, 
Article VII, of this agreement to the extent that such definition is otherwise 
applicable. 
1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. V. 
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tween the Superintendent of Schools and the Union on educa-
tional matters of mutual interest and concern. This meant that the 
Board, while reserving to itself the final decision in these matters, 
would permit the Union to press its position in separate discussions 
away from the bargaining table. The parties expressed this new con-
sultative role for the Union in a formal declaration included as a 
"Preamble" to, but not a part of the substantive terms of, the second 
collective bargaining agreement. In the "Preamble," the Board of 
Education and the Union "recognize that they have a common re-
sponsibility beyond their collective bargaining relationship," and 
they "declare their mutual intent to work together toward the 
achievement of common aims of educational excellence." For this 
purpose, they agreed to "meet and consult" once a month during the 
school year "on matters of educational policy and development." 
One of the specific subjects of joint consultation was the develop-
ment of a program for the improvement of "difficult schools."30 
A related clash of positions demonstrated another limitation on 
the scope of collective bargaining in public education. The Union 
demanded that the agreement include specific provisions concerning 
the length of the school year, the length of teacher vacations, and re-
lated matters, all of which the Board had previously regulated by 
means of bylaw. The Board conceded that these matters had a direct 
bearing on working conditions but insisted that they were essential 
to its discretionary authority to manage the school system and hence 
could not be bargained away for a fixed period. The Union then 
sought definite assurance that the existing bylaws would not be 
changed during the term of the agreement; accordingly, it asked that 
the provisions of the bylaws be incorporated into the contract. The 
Board, asserting its continuing legal obligation to govern the school 
system according to changing educational needs, refused to yield the 
freedom to amend its bylaws when necessary. One salient example 
of the need for continued flexibility, the Board suggested, was the 
possibility that the school year would have to be lengthened or varied 
to make up for lost school time due to teachers' strikes. In the end, 
the parties resolved the dispute by narrowing the subjects of contro-
versy to sick leave, sabbatical leaves, vacations, and holidays. The 
Board expressly agreed that it would continue its "present policy" as 
to these subjects, "except insofar as change is commanded by law."40 
So critical to both sides were the implications of the fundamental 
39. 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10. 
40. Id. art. XIV. 
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issues resolved in the second round of negotiations that a serious 
public dispute arose benveen the Board and the Union as to what 
the one had yielded and the other had won. The parties met this 
threat to the completion of a final agreement by adding to the con-
tract an epilogue entitled "Conclusion." This conclusion, repro-
duced here in part, provides significant internal evidence of the se-
rious struggle which characterized the second phase of the bargaining 
history: 
In a field of collective bargaining which presents new and unresolved 
problems, the parties have successfully defined the proper area of 
interest on the part of the teachers in their rates of pay and condi-
tions of work while providing simultaneously a mechanism for the 
teachers through their union to convey to the Board their views 
based on their knowledge and experience on matters of educational 
policy and professional concern. This agreement provides terms and 
conditions for the joint relationship which will redound not only to 
the benefit of the Board and teachers but more particularly to the 
students as well. At the same time it makes clear that the Board has 
complete authority over the policies and administration of the school 
system which it exercises under the provisions of law and in the ful-
filling of its responsibilities under this agreement.41 
The second agreement, eighteen printed pages longer than its prede-
cessor, was not signed until February 10, 1964. 
IV. THE THIRD STAGE: MATURITY AND UNION POWER 
By the early winter of 1965, when negotiations commenced for a 
third agreement, collective bargaining had become the accepted tech-
nique for determining the salaries and working conditions of New 
York City teachers. The grievance procedure had become the prin-
cipal mechanism for resolving complaints by teachers that they were 
not receiving the benefits assured them by the collective bargaining 
contract or by established practice. 42 When the grievance process 
failed, the Union submitted numerous cases to arbitration for final 
and binding decisions by neutral third parties chosen by both sides.43 
The process of regular joint consultation on a year-round basis 
added a new and broader dimension to the teacher-Board relation-
ship. Through this process the Union became a truly powerful force 
41. 1963-65 Agreement, supra note IO. 
42. By the end of the school year in June 1965, 285 grievances had been filed at 
the last agency step of the grievance procedure. 
43. Twenty cases were taken to arbitration by the end of the school year in June 
1965. 
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in school administration. The earliest product of joint consultation 
was the completion, through a joint committee, of the "More 
Effective Schools Plan" (MES), which was put into operation in a 
few schools on an experimental basis.44 As a further aspect of the 
Union's new role in administrative and policy matters, it participated 
in planning the Board's internal procedures for administering the 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, it ap-
peared before school administrators and Board committees on the 
issuance of new licenses, the creation of new positions in the schools, 
and other matters of educational import. During this period the 
Union also awoke to its responsibility to enforce that provision of the 
contract under which the Board undertook to make no changes with 
respect to "matters not covered by this agreement which are proper 
subjects for collective bargaining" without "appropriate prior con-
sultation and negotiation with the Union."45 On several occasions, the 
Board withdrew items appearing on the calendar for action at a 
public meeting upon the Union's insistence that the matter was a 
proper subject for collective bargaining and that "prior consultation 
and negotiation" had not taken place.46 
In the negotiations for a third agreement, the Union fared well 
in its salary demands and in obtaining other benefits for the teachers. 
Thus, the third contract made benefits less conditional on budgetary 
limitations. It afforded regular substitute teachers,47 who had limited 
rights under law and a tenuous hold on their employment, rights of 
assignment under uniform and objective procedures and a rea-
sonable measure of job security. Moreover, the new contract ac-
corded regularly appointed teachers, generally unable to transfer to 
another school except through personal arrangements, the benefits 
of a transfer plan based on reasonable standards to be uniformly 
applied. It made the grievance procedure less formal, and opened 
recourse to arbitration for some complaints based upon policy provi-
44. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra. 
45. 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. XIV. 
46. An example of an item withdrawn from a public calendar upon protest by 
the Union at a public meeting was a proposed resolution for commencing the 1966-67 
school year two days earlier than usual and requiring teachers to report for duty two 
days earlier than in prior years. The Union claimed that the proposal would, in 
fact, shorten the summer vacation of teachers and hence would violate that part of 
the agreement in which the Board undertook "to continue its present policy with 
respect to ••• vacations." See text accompanying note 40 supra. The Board took the 
position that its interpretation of the language in question permitted the proposed 
action. It asked the Union to take the matter to arbitration under the grievance 
procedure. The Union refused and threatened to keep the teachers out of school on 
the two days of proposed early reporting. The Board subsequently abandoned the 
proposal. 
47. These teachers constituted about one-third of the teaching staff. 
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sions of the agreement. In addition, the contract expanded the class-
room teacher unit for which the Union had obtained recognition to 
include those who served in part-time teaching programs conducted 
by the Board. 48 
But much more was at stake in the third set of negotiations than 
just wages and teacher benefits. The new theme in forging the third 
agreement was enhancement of the Union's status in the schools and 
in the school system. By now the Union was representing more than 
45,000 teachers in the day-school system, and thousands among them 
who were serving in additional part-time assignments, as well as 
other units of collateral pedagogical employees.49 The Union was 
seeking security for itself as an organization; it wanted the prestige 
and power which would attract and retain a growing membership. 
Accordingly, it asked the Board for the favored treatment that would 
give it that prestige and power. In short, the Union was seeking some 
of the incidents and advantages of exclusive representation which 
were already commonplace in private employment but which had 
not been completely accepted in the public sector. In part, this differ-
ence between the public and private sectors was due to conflict be-
tween the principles of the merit system and the closed shop or union 
shop.110 In part, it was due to the generally recognized obligation 
upon government to spend public money only for public purposes. 
In its earlier agreements, the Union had obtained some of the 
more common privileges attendant upon exclusive bargaining status. 
48. The broadened unit included, in addition to all classroom teachers in the 
regular day school instructional program, "all those employed as per session teachers." 
1965-1967 Agreement, supra note 11, art. I. The new grouping, among whom the 
Union had established majority representation, was composed of all those who were 
employed as teachers in one or more of the numerous after-school, evening, and 
summer programs conducted by the Board of Education. 
The designation of "per session" teacher derives from the fact that each work 
period, consisting of a stated number of hours, is known as a "session," for which 
teachers are paid a "per session" rate. Except for a small number of teachers in sum-
mer day camps and in evening adult classes, the per session assignments are held by 
day school teachers. At the time of the third agreement, a number of these teachers 
were multiple per session jobholders filling after-school, evening, and su=er posi-
tions. The Board pondered the wisdom of extending bargaining rights for these extra 
jobs and then decided to treat the group as though they were separate, regularly 
employed, part-time workers. The Board was thus involved in negotiating separate 
sets of working conditions for the same employees-as though they were in fact dif-
ferent persons than those employed in the day schools. 
49. Attendance teachers, psychologists and social workers, school secretaries, 
guidance counselors, and laboratory assistants-totaling approximately 4,000 employees 
as of that time. 
50. The Federal government's position was clearly stated in PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, 
supra note 22, at 25: 
The Task Force wishes to state its emphatic opinion that the union shop and the 
closed shop are contrary to the civil service concept upon which Federal em-
ployment is based, and are completely inappropriate to the Federal service. 
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Thus, it had obtained the exclusive use of at least one bulletin board 
in each school "for purposes of posting material dealing with proper 
and legitimate Union business."51 The Board had accorded a limited 
number of leaves of absence without pay but with service credit for 
salary increment and retirement purposes to teachers who were offi-
cers or staff members of the Union.52 While union activity on working 
time was prohibited, the Board had assured members of the Union's 
negotiating committee and its special consultants that they would 
be excused "without loss of pay" for working time spent in negotia-
tions with the Board or its representatives. 53 At the individual school 
level, organized by the Union as a "chapter," prior agreements had 
granted the following perquisites of exclusive bargaining status: 
chapter chairmen were allowed "reasonable time during school 
hours" to investigate grievances;54 meetings of the school chapte1 
were permitted within the school "under circumstances which will 
not interfere with the instructional program";55 and the principal of 
the school was required to meet with the chapter committee once a 
month during the school year "to consult on matters of school policy 
and on questions relating to the implementation of this agree-
ment."56 
In the third round of negotiations, the Union did not demand 
any of the conventional union security clauses.57 It sought the 
following forms of special treatment: First, it wanted the Board 
51. This provision was contained in both of the previous agreements. 1962-1963 
Agreement, supra note 3, art. X; 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. X. 
52. This provision was also contained in both of the previous agreements. 1962-1963 
Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII; 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. VIII. 
53. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3, art. VII; 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 
10, art. II. 
54. 1962-1963 Agreement, supra note 3, art. VI, § B(8); 1963-1965 Agreement, supra 
note 10, art. VI, § B(8). 
55. This provision was not contained in the first agreement covering the 1962-1963 
school year, but was incorporated into the second contract, 1963-1965 Agreement, 
supra note 10, art. XI. 
56. This provision was first added in the second contract covering the 1963-1964 
and 1964-1965 school years, 1963-1965 Agreement, supra note 10, art. XII. 
57. Nor could it ask for the right of exclusive representation of all teachers in the 
unit in grievance prosecution and arbitration. Special legislation pertaining only to 
teachers, enacted by the state legislature in 1964 and presumably still in effect, had 
vitiated the exclusive representation right for grievance prosecution which had been 
given to the Union in prior agreements. This was accomplished by means of language 
stating that the representative of "the public school teacher" in the presentation of 
his grievance "shall be designated by the public school teacher at the time he presents 
his grievance or at a subsequent date." GEN. MuN1c. LAW, § 603-a (McKinney 1965). 
The legislation was directed at a prior decision of the State Commissioner of Edu-
cation that upheld the Union's exclusive right, as against any minority organization, 
to represent teachers under the grievance procedure prescribed in the first agreement. 
Matter of City Teachers Association of New York, Decision No. 7262 (Aug. 13, 1963). 
Hence, a teacher-grievant may select a minority organization to represent him in 
pursuit of the benefits negotiated in the agreement by the exclusive bargaining agent. 
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to abolish completely an established professional employee organiza-
tion-the Policy Consultation Council-with which the Board had 
consulted for many years on various matters of educational and 
school policy. The Council was part of a Staff Relations Plan issued 
by the Board in 1956 following consultation with employee organi-
zations and professional groups. In some structural respects, the 
Council resembled some of the company-devised employee repre-
sentation plans encountered in private industry at an earlier time. 
The Union, insistent upon becoming the sole voice for teachers on 
matters of educational policy at the individual school level, also 
asked for the abolition of the Staff Relations Committees-the or-
gans of the Staff Relations Plan at the individual schools. Such 
groups, the Union argued, were a threat to its exclusive bargaining 
status and should no longer be permitted to exist alongside a collec-
tive bargaining representative; even if, as the Board maintained, 
these groups were purged of all negotiating and grievance functions, 
they were still anachronisms whose survival could not be justified. 
The Union also sought favored status for the chapter chairman at 
each school. It asked the Board to make the office more attractive by 
arranging a lighter program of school duties for the chapter chairman 
in order to allow him more time during the school day for the tasks of 
his union office. Finally, and most significantly, the Union wished to 
administer unilaterally a welfare fund to which the Board was the 
sole contributor. 
The Union won each of these demands either entirely or to a 
substantial degree. It won them on the theory that the privileges 
were an accepted perquisite of exclusive representation and that they 
would promote a stable and responsible collective bargaining rela-
tionship in the school system. The third agreement expressly 
stripped the Policy Consultation Council of all functions, and the 
Board undertook to adopt an appropriate resolution for its disestab-
lishment."58 The Staff Relations Committees were to be discon-
tinued in any school where, as evidenced by valid check-off authori-
zations, 59 a majority of the faculty were members of the Union. 
Moreover, the agreement granted to chapter chairmen a stated num-
58. The supervisors were the dominant groups remaining in the Policy Consulta-
tion Council at that time. However, they had already formed another organization, 
the Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA), composed of constituent organizations 
of supervisors at various levels of authority. On May 5, 1965, in a joint "Memorandum 
of Agreement," the Board recognized the CSA as the exclusive representative of all 
supervisors eligible for membership in each of its constituent organizations and agreed 
to meet and consult with it "on matters of educational policy and development" and 
on the working conditions, salary schedules, and grievances of the supervisors. 
59. The job was finished in the next agreement, when all remaining Staff Rela-
tions Committees were abolished. 
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ber of duty-free periods during the week for handling grievances and 
union business. The Union also acquired two additional leaves of 
absence for its teacher-officers or staff members. 
But the grant of authority to administer unilaterally a welfare fund 
consisting entirely of Board contributions was the most unexpected 
concession to the Union. Welfare benefits were granted for the first 
time in the third agreement. That agreement stipulated that the 
Board would provide funds at the rate of 100 dollars per teacher per 
year during the first year of the agreement, and at the rate of 140 
dollars per year during the second year, prorated on a monthly basis 
"for the purpose of making available for each day school teacher" sup-
plemental welfare benefits "under a plan to be devised and estab-
lished jointly by representatives of the Union and of the Board."60 
The details of the plan were to be left to later negotiation. The 
Board had earlier informed the Union of its intention to establish a 
welfare fund to be jointly administered under a plan whereby both 
sides would appoint trustees in a manner similar to the requirements 
of federal law for welfare funds in private industry.61 Such a plan 
would have been modeled after the administration of the welfare 
fund for employees of the City Transit Authority, an autonomous 
agency established for the City of New York by state law. After ac-
cepting the Board's earlier proposal, however, the Union learned 
that the New York City government had approved a standard wel-
fare fund arrangement with unions representing its employees which 
provided for unilateral union administration and management. 
The United Federation of Teachers then insisted upon the City's 
standard unilateral arrangement. The Board, concerned about 
the public policy and legal aspects of the payments and of the 
unilateral union administration of the fund, sought the opinion 
of the New York City Corporation Counsel. The Corporation 
Counsel advised early in 1966 that the Board's contributions to 
the proposed welfare fund were for a proper public purpose and that 
the proposed arrangement for unilateral administration would not 
violate the Board's fiduciary responsibility in the expenditure of 
public monies. The Board thereupon entered into a supplemental 
agreement with the Union requiring it to pay into the "United Fed-
eration of Teachers Welfare Fund"62 the amounts specified in the 
third basic contract. The supplemental agreement provided that 
"the Fund shall be administered and managed by five Trustees, who 
shall be appointed by the Administrative Committee of the Union." 
60. 1965-1967 Agreement, supra note 11, art. III, § E(2). 
61. Welfare&: Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1964). 
62. Hereinafter referred to as the "UFT Welfare Fund" or the "Fund." 
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The Union anticipated that the Board's contributions to the Fund 
during the term of the new agreement would reach a rate of eight 
million dollars per year for all units which it represented. 
The strict accounting, auditing, and reporting requirements of 
this welfare-fund agreement, its controls on administration, and its 
emphasis on the fiduciary responsibilities of trustees afforded reason-
able assurance against misuse of Board contributions. Thus, the 
Union's power did not turn on mere control over the disposition 
of large sums of money. The important thing was that new and 
highly valuable benefits were available to teachers through an ad-
ministrative facility designated as "the United Federation of Teachers 
Welfare Fund." This undoubtedly afforded the Union the greater 
measure of prestige and power which it needed to gain and retain 
substantial numbers of new members. 63 · 
While the benefits were expressly available under the collective 
bargaining agreement to all employees in the unit without regard 
to their membership in the Union, there is reason to assume that 
the impression was nevertheless created that membership was either 
a condition precedent to receipt of benefits or an advantage in their 
dispensation. The fact that the Fund was designated as the "United 
Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund" might reasonably have led 
the uninformed to suppose that the Union was actually expending 
its own money and hence would limit its largesse to its members. The 
Union's simultaneous grant of additional benefits from its own funds 
to union members only might well have heightened the confusion. 
Even those who understood that the Board provided the contribu-
tions to the "UFT Welfare Fund" might still have been uncertain as 
to whether nonmembers were intended beneficiaries; nor would it be 
unreasonable for them to assume that the disbursement of Board 
funds controlled by the Union might tend to favor union members. 
The Union's administration of the Fund at the school level tended 
to strengthen the association in some teachers' minds between eligi-
bility for welfare benefits and union membership. Thus, the chapter 
chairmen at the individual schools were the sole distributors of 
benefit application and fund enrollment forms. Employees com-
plained to the Board of Education that the chapter chairmen in 
some schools gave the necessary forms only to union members. 
63. For a discussion of the importance of this Fund to the Union, see Foreword, 
Message from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, in Health and Welfare Benefits 
(published and distributed to New York City Schools by the Union): "New 
York City teachers are justly proud in the achievement represented by the United 
Federation of Teachers Welfare Fund. The United Federation of Teachers Welfare 
Fund is an historic first. It is the first teacher welfare fund in the history of American 
education." 
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Schools having no union members, and hence no chapter chairman, 
were overlooked initially. Moreover, chapter chairmen were re-
sponsible for distributing literature on welfare-fund benefits, ini-
tially to all employees in each school and then regularly to new em-
ployees. Those unaccustomed to careful textual scrutiny may well 
have wondered whether union membership was not a condition of 
access to the valuable coverage described in the publications. The 
lack of clarity stemmed from the language of the basic booklet, 
which was entitled "Health and Welfare Benefits" and subtitled 
"For members of the fund and their families/UFT Welfare Fund." 
In its opening statement, the booklet asserted that all employees for 
whom the Board contributes money to the "UFT Welfare Fund, are 
hereinafter referred to interchangeably as 'covered employees', mem-
bers of the Fund, or members." While the term "members" was thus 
technically tied to the Fund, its usage in connection with the avail-
ability of particular benefits may have led some teachers to believe 
that the term referred to union membership.64 Although the Board 
brought to the Union's attention complaints by nonmembers of 
their disparate treatment by chapter chairmen, and even though 
the Union investigated and corrected instances of discriminatory 
action, it can scarcely be denied that the Union retained a funda-
mental advantage in its unilateral administration of the welfare 
fund. Indeed, the October 7, 1966, issue of the Union's official 
publication reported a "startling jump" in membership in the first 
month of the new school year.65 
v. THE FOURTH STAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC-INTEREST 
ISSUES PECULIAR TO THE ENTERPRISE 
The negotiations for the fourth, and current, agreement between 
the teachers and the Board emphasized the fundamental importance 
of the public-interest factor in public employment bargaining. Two 
basic components of the public-interest factor had, of course, ap-
peared in earlier negotiating encounters: setting priorities among 
64. As an example of the later carry-over of the special term "member" to other 
literature, several statements in the Fund News (published and distributed to all 
schools in February 1968) explained that new benefits made possible by the fourth 
agreement with the Board would be granted to "our eligible members," or to "mem-
bers,'' or to "the eligible employee-member." The Board received a number of in• 
quiries from some employees seeking clarification of eligibility for the benefits and 
from others complaining of the exclusion of nonmembers of the UFT from the new 
benefits. 
65. United Federation of Teachers, UNITED TEACHER. Other issues showed that 
membership increased by 8,000 from September of the first year of the third agreement 
to December of its second year. 
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competing demands upon available Board funds for the administra-
tion of educational programs and the general operation of the school 
system; and separating the realm of wages, hours, and working con-
ditions from the domain of governmental policy and public manage-
ment. ' 
The first public-interest component concerns the public agency's 
judgment as to what part of its total budget it can conscientiously 
commit to employee gains and benefits consistent with the public in-
terest. In collective bargaining on economic demands-wages, fringe 
benefits, and working conditions-the Board has repeatedly asserted 
that its first concern in the fiduciary allocation of public funds must 
be the "good of the children." The Union's typical reply has been: 
"Teachers want what children need." In the end, the public has ac-
quiesced in the final budgetary allocations for teacher gains and ben-
efits-an acceptance based either on the perceived value of economic 
benefits as forces in educational improvement or on their worth in 
avoiding the educational and social hazards of a deferred school 
opening. 
The second public-interest component is more fundamental: 
how can bilateral collective bargaining be limited in scope to mat-
ters directly affecting the employment relationship? How can it be 
kept from intruding upon the essential mission of a governmental 
agency such as the Board of Education, which has been entrusted 
with a nondelegable duty to design and operate an educational system 
in the public interest? As noted earlier, the precise scope of collective 
bargaining has not been easy to define. Previous differences have 
been resolved when the Union withdrew certain items from the bar-
gaining table, when the Board ceded some of its authority in twi-
light-zone disputes, or when the parties devised other mechanisms of 
union participation, such as consultation and discussion. It was dur-
ing the negotiations for the fourth agreement, however, that the 
sharpest and most stubborn public-interest conflicts emerged. 
By the winter of 1967, the Board and parent and community 
groups had become persuaded that the improved working conditions 
granted to teachers in past agreements had impeded the attainment 
of higher educational goals for children. At the center of their con-
cern were the children in the "special service schools" located in the 
low socio-economic areas of the city. For these children, learning 
sights and educational achievements were concededly low. The 
Board was convinced that the interaction of three factors-a ge1_1eral 
teacher shortage, inability to recruit a conscientious career staff, and 
unrealistic working conditions prescribed by prior collective bargain-
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ing agreements--was hampering its efforts to provide a better educa-
tion where it was needed most. In order to attract competent and ex-
perienced teachers to special service schools and retain them there, 
the Board had previously agreed with the Union to reduce the 
amount of teaching time required of teachers during their six and 
one-third hours of daily attendance in those schools; it had corre-
spondingly increased the number of preparation periods. The third 
agreement had granted to teachers in the special service elementary 
schools two additional preparation periods per week (for a total of 
four) during which they were relieved of teaching duties and were 
expected to devote themselves to unsupervised and unassigned pro-
fessional tasks. In the special service junior high schools, the Board 
reduced teaching time from twenty-four to twenty-two forty-five 
minute periods per week and increased preparation periods from 
six to eight per week. Three other provisions of past agreements also 
contributed to the Board's dilemma: the increase in the number and 
succession of paid sick-leave days for regular and substitute teachers 
for which no authenticating physician's certificate was required; the 
commitment to relieve teachers of teaching duties during prepara-
tion periods--except in an "emergency"; and the agreement to give 
teachers general control over the use of their preparation periods. 
The practical impact of these four categories of improved work-
ing conditions on the education of children in special service schools 
became evident during the second year of the third agreement. The 
effect of the reduction in teaching time was to require the Board to 
increase the number of teachers in each school at a rate sufficient 
to provide each child with a full day's instruction. This meant 
recruiting several thousand new teachers. The system's experienced 
teachers did not find the lighter teaching schedules a sufficient in-
ducement to lure them into the special service schools. Hence, the 
Board had to tap whatever sources of new teachers were available 
outside the school system. The tremendous expansion in staff 
brought to many special service schools untried and unseasoned re-
cruits as well as a large number of casual or transient substitutes un-
willing or unprepared to qualify for regular appointment. At best, 
the staffs which were recruited for these schools were often inade-
quate to the educational challenges presented. Nor was there any 
time during nonteaching periods which the Board could utilize for 
sustained teacher training and orientation. Still worse, the compara-
tive rate of staff absenteeism for alleged illness increased markedly in 
these schools--particularly on the days preceding and following 
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week-ends and holidays. If the principal exhausted the roster of 
neighborhood substitute teachers willing to "fill in" on a daily basis, 
he was forced to assign other teachers in the school to "cover" the 
teacherless class. For the children, the excessive absences meant inter-
mittent breaks in the continuity of their badly needed instruction. 
For the teachers who were required to "cover" the teacherless class, 
it meant the reluctant surrender of one or more highly prized 
preparation periods. 66 Faced with these consequences, the Board be-
came convinced that the four types of teacher benefits negotiated in 
the third contract were in fact educationally unprofitable and that 
their monetary cost could be put to substantial productive use if 
diverted to other needs of the system. Accordingly, it appeared to 
the Board that a return to pre-existing conditions and the introduc-
tion of new restrictions might be a partial answer to its dilemma. 
To achieve its own goals and to meet the objections of parent 
groups, the Board prepared a set of demands incorporating proposals 
for changes in the new agreement which would, among other things: 
(1) increase the number of teaching periods and reduce the number 
of preparation periods in the special service elementary and junior 
high schools; (2) reduce the number and succession of paid sick-leave 
days for which no authenticating physician's certificate was required; 
(3) revise the transfer plan to encourage transfers of experienced 
teachers to schools having a low experience index; (4) require teach-
ers to attend training and orientation courses after school hours and 
during their preparation periods; and (5) favor the novice teacher 
with less difficult class assignments. The Union, on the other hand, 
sought a further reduction in teaching time at all levels and an ex-
pansion in the number of nonteaching preparation and professional 
periods,67 such nonteaching time to be used at the complete dis-
cretion of the teacher. As compensation for loss of preparation 
periods because of teacherless classes, or for any other reason, the 
Union requested the Board to contribute to the welfare fund "at 
twice the maximum hourly per session rate for the time lost." 
Moreover, the Union wanted five additional days of paid sick-leave 
allowance and the complete abolition of the need for an au-
66. While teacher grievances on loss of preparation periods for class coverage were 
not sustained because of the "emergency" nature of the assignment, an arbitrator 
nevertheless observed that a continuing state of emergency due to teacher shortage 
might not be a valid defense to excessive class coverages. He suggested better planning 
for recruitment. 
67. The "professional" period is a period in which the teacher is relieved of an 
administrative assignment, as differentiated from a "preparation" period in which the 
relief is from teaching duties. 
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thenticating physician's certificate. It also sought five additional days 
per year of paid leave for "personal business." 
The clash of positions on these and other public-interest issues 
remained persistently intractable through three separate phases of 
mediation efforts conducted successively during the period following 
expiration of the third agreement on June 30, 1967.68 Among the 
public-interest differences were two which proved to be particularly 
divisive: the problem of the so-called "disruptive" pupil and the 
controversy over the More Effective Schools program (MES). The 
conflict over these issues illustrated again how difficult it is to sep-
arate the realm of collective bargaining from the domain of gov-
ernmental policy-making, and how delicate the balance is between 
the pull of public-interest concerns and the force of special group 
demands. 
The Union submitted for incorporation in the fourth agreement 
a new section entitled "A Program To Remove Disruptive Children 
from Regular Classrooms." The proposal consisted of three subsec-
tions, which respectively recited the objectives of the program, set 
forth procedures for the effectuation of those objectives, and defined 
the role of the Union and the specific responsibilities of the Board 
to the Union. The principal objective was to vest in the classroom 
teacher a major share of the discretion to decide whether a child's 
behavior was so "disruptive" as to warrant his transfer from a reg-
ular classroom to other facilities more "appropriate" to his educa-
tional needs. The subsection on procedure began with the statement, 
"A teacher may exclude from his class a child whose behavior is caus-
ing serious disruption in the classroom." It then set forth the follow-
ing three grounds for the exclusion of a "disruptive" child: (1) "En-
dangering the health and/ or safety of (himself and) other children 
(e.g., fighting, smoking)"; (2) "Intimidation of the teacher and/or 
fellow students"; and (3) "Inciting to violence." Finally, the subsec-
tion described the steps to be pursued following a child's exclusion 
from the classroom. These steps included a report by the teacher and 
a conference between the teacher and members of the school's behav-
ioral and supervisory staff to plan the necessary remedial measures. 
The subsection called for an interview with the child and 
a meeting with his parents, both in the presence of the teacher. 
It also prescribed mandatory remedies of permanent removal from 
the teacher's class or of suspension from the school under specified 
68. The Union submitted altogether 670 demands on which over 100 negotiating 
sessions had been held by the expiration of the agreement on June 30, 1967; by 
then, an accord had been reached on only a few items. 
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circumstances. The teacher was to have the right "to be accompanied 
by a United Federation of Teachers representative through all phases 
of this procedure."69 
The Union's policy justification for the demand was that the be-
havior of disruptive children in some of the city's "difficult" schools 
so seriously undermined the stability of the normal classroom situ-
ation as to make it almost impossible for the teacher to teach and 
for other children to learn. The Union's explanation for placing the 
subject on the bargaining agenda was that violence and threats of vio-
lence by pupils against fellow-students and teachers, as well as other 
types of unmanageable pupil conduct, were so widespread as to affect 
seriously the working conditions of teachers. The Union claimed 
that the Board had no effective central policy for dealing with the 
plight of the teachers and that school administrators were conse-
quently unwilling to remove disruptive pupils from regular class-
rooms and place them in other facilities. The Union saw the teacher 
as the victim of a grave injustice against which he had no recourse 
and no effective remedy. Hence, the Union sought to negotiate both 
the procedure of the recourse and the substance of the remedy; in 
so doing, it placed the greatest emphasis upon the teacher's right to 
take the initial self-help step himself and then to participate in all 
phases of the decision on the ultimate outcome. 70 
To the Board, the proper placement of the disruptive child in 
the school system was a matter of educational policy. And the role 
of educational policy maker, the Board insisted, could not be ceded 
to an individual teacher or to an outside body. Moreover, the 
Board did not share the Union's view that the teacher was neces-
sarily an innocent victim of antisocial pupil habits in the classroom. 
The Board suggested that a poor or inexperienced teacher might well 
generate disruptive behavior because of inability to establish the re-
lationships with pupils necessary to command their respect and re-
tain attention. Parent groups shared the Board's views and foresaw 
in the Union's plan the possibility of placing in the hands of weak 
or hostile teachers the power to determine the educational fate of 
children already in need of intensive instructional care. As the nego-
tiations reached the second mediation phase, the Board offered to 
prepare, in consultation with the Union, a Superintendent's circular 
69. The Union's proposal was a modified version of a provision obtained by its 
sister American Federation of Teachers Local in Detroit, Michigan, in the latter's 
1966-1967 collective bargaining agreement. 
70. The dispute was essentially over the so-called unmanageable or disruptive 
child, as distinguished from the pupil who engages in acts of violence against the 
teacher or a fellow student. The Board had a definite policy covering acts of violence. 
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for school administrators which would establish appropriate proce-
dures for handling serious student behavior problems. The Board was 
not willing, however, to make the circular or its procedures con-
tractually binding. For its part, the Union indicated a willingness 
to have an outside panel on which the Union would be represented 
make the final decision on the disposition of the pupil, but it stood 
firm in its demand to negotiate the procedures and include them in 
the agreement. 
A similar stalemate developed around the MES program.71 The 
Board had adopted the program in 1964 for a limited number of 
elementary schools as an experiment in elevating pupil achievement 
levels in slum areas through changes in school organization and 
structure. Briefly stated, the salient features of the plan for each 
school included: a relatively small total number of pupils, reduced 
class sizes, an increased ratio of classroom teachers and guidance 
counselors to pupils, additional small-group instruction, increased 
funds for educational materials and school supplies, and frequent 
consultation between faculty and administrators on teaching and 
supervision goals and techniques. Moreover, each school was to have 
on its staff a full-time team of experts in pupil-personnel services-
psychologist, social worker, attendance teacher, speech therapist, and 
community coordinator. Apart from the obvious improvements in 
working conditions afforded teachers by the experimental MES de-
sign, the plan offered them additional advantages in the form of 
more preparation periods, freedom from secretarial tasks, freedom 
from nonteaching duties, and the ability to hold conferences during 
school hours. The Union regarded itself as the real architect of the 
fundamental design of the plan. It had looked upon the plan as the 
best "school-by-school approach to the problem of providing schools 
which can really educate children in spite of any environmental 
handicaps they may bring to school with them."72 It also viewed the 
plan as a model for other city school systems faced with the chal-
lenge of achieving academic and social progress for their children. 
As noted above, the Union had in 1963 insisted upon placing its 
proposals for the improvement of "difficult" schools on the bargain-
ing table.73 The Board's position at that time was that the subject 
was not within the ambit of collective bargaining. The parties re-
71. See text accompanying note 44 supra. 
72. See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS FOR ALL CHILDREN 
(1964); AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, THE MORE EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS PROGRAM IN 
NEW YORK CITY (1964). 
73. See text accompanying note 68 supra. 
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solved the dispute through the mechanism of a "Preamble" to the 
agreement which provided for regular joint consultation sessions be-
tween the Union and the Superintendent of Schools. The MES pro-
gram grew out of those joint consultations. · 
Twenty-one MES program schools were in operation when the 
parties began their negotiations for a fourth agreement. Now the 
Union asked that "every elementary school located in a ghetto or 
disadvantaged area of the City shall be made a More Effective 
School." This would mean the reorganization of about 300 elemen-
tary schools in accordance with the MES plan. The Union also 
sought from the Board a definite contractual commitment in behalf 
of the expanded program, together with assurances that the Board 
would not modify the elements of the program without the concur-
rence of the Union. While not unaware of the substantial improve-
ments in working conditions that would inure to teachers from ex-
pansion of the plan, the Board saw the fundamental issue as one of 
educational policy affecting children-an area of decision-making in 
which parents and the community had the greater stake. The Board 
consequently took the position that the bargaining process was not 
the appropriate technique for formulating educational programs of 
this type, and that a collective bargaining agreement was not the 
suitable medium for recording them. Moreover, although cognizant 
of the Union's commitment to MES as its special professional con-
tribution in the search for an answer to the ghetto school problem, 
the Board was not convinced that the twenty-one-school experiment 
was demonstrating its cost effectiveness. In the Board's view, other 
Board-instituted programs aimed at developing the learning abilities 
of children in the early school years held greater promise for a 
larger number of children at a lower comparative cost. As the 
negotiations ground through the second mediation phase, the Board 
indicated its willingness to assure the Union that it would not 
reduce the number of schools then involved in the MES program, 
and that it would not modify the elements of the existing programs 
without prior consultation with the Union. 
A special mediation panel named by Mayor Lindsay74 attempted 
from mid-August to one week before the opening of school in Sep-
tember to provide a basis for a peaceful resolution of the critical 
public-interest issues still in dispute: teaching time, preparation 
time and its use, teacher training, absence allowances, the disruptive 
pupil, and MES. In its report to the Mayor on September 4, 1967, 
74. The panel was composed of Professor Archibald Cox, chairman, Professor 
Walter Gellhom, and Dean Russell D. Niles. 
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the panel made the following recommendations as to all matters 
other than the disruptive pupil and MES: 
(1) The number of preparation and other nonteaching profes-
sional periods should remain unchanged. 
(2) The assignment of a teacher to "cover" a teacherless class 
should be recognized as a proper "emergency" measure pro-
vided that compensatory time be given for preparation pe-
riods (beyond a stated minimum) lost by reason of such as-
signment. 
(3) Preparation time and other professional nonteaching time 
should be subject generally to the teacher's control, except 
that a new teacher without prior professional experience 
could be directed during his first year of employment to 
devote "a reasonable number of his preparation periods, not 
to exceed twenty, to observing classes conducted by more 
experienced teachers or to consulting others familiar with 
classroom problems." 
(4) The existing sick leave provisions should remain in effect 
pending agreement on a new kind of leave plan proposed in 
the report. This new plan, the panel suggested, would not 
only reduce the opportunity for abuse and encourage the 
provident utilization of paid leave allowances, but would 
also eliminate a physician's authenticating certificate in most 
instances. 
(5) A new teacher without prior professional experience could 
be favored in classroom assignments and could be directed 
by the Superintendent of Schools to participate in an after-
school training program for a specified number of hours dur-
ing the year. 
(6) The teacher-transfer plan should be revised to take into ac-
count a better distribution of the more experienced teachers. 
As to the disruptive pupil and MES, the mediation panel re-
ported that, because of the complexity of the issues and the unusual 
and serious social considerations involved, it would be unwise to 
attempt to resolve the disputes "as part of crisis negotiations over 
the more conventional terms of a labor contract." The panel pro-
posed, therefore, that each of the issues be settled on an interim 
procedural basis which, without prejudicing the rights of either 
party, would allow for continued study over a period of time by 
experts as well as by such interested persons as parents and other 
March 1969] Public Education 1063 
groups who "cannot share in labor negotiations." The mediators 
contemplated as an interim procedural device the establishment of 
two separate special advisory committees composed of representa-
tives of the Union, the Board, and the Mayor. These special com-
mittees would study separately the disruptive pupil and MES prob-
lems, consult with interested persons, and from time to time make 
recommendations to the Board. The panel noted that under this 
kind of interim disposition, the Union would not surrender any col-
lective bargaining rights if, in the end, it were dissatisfied with the 
committees' proposals as to either of the matters under study. 
On September 6, 1967, the Board accepted the mediators' report 
and prepared, as its last offer, a proposed new agreement incorporat-
ing the panel's recommendations. On September 10, the eve of the 
scheduled opening of schools, the Union membership rejected the 
Board's offer after the Union's officials had also turned it down. 
From September 11 to September 28, when the membership ratified 
the final proposed agreement, the City experienced the longest 
teacher strike in its history as of that time. 75 During the strike, the 
parties conducted further negotiations within the framework of the 
mediation panel's recommendations and under the watchful eye of 
the Mayor and two other mediators designated by him. The num-
ber of public-interest issues was reduced somewhat by agreement or 
by modification or withdrawal. The Union's position had now hard-
ened around the following last-ditch residue of its earlier de-
mands: (I) an additional preparation period per week in the special 
service elementary schools; (2) additional sick leave allowances and 
elimination of the need for a physician's authentication; (3) utiliza-
tion of the nonteaching professional period in the junior high and 
high schools at the teacher's discretion; (4) specified procedures for 
handling the "disruptive" pupil; and (5) expansion of the MES 
program by contractual commitment. 
In the end, a settlement was reached in which the Union 
achieved most of its final substantive demands directly affecting 
teacher working conditions, and the Board abandoned or modified 
its original stance in those areas. Thus, the Union won its fifth prep-
aration period in the special service elementary schools, effective as 
of the second year of the agreement. But it yielded to the Board's 
75. Six United Federation of Teachers units of pedagogical employees other than 
classroom teachers were also involved in the negotiations and in the strike. They were 
school secretaries, guidance counselors, psychologists and social workers, attendance 
teachers, laboratory assistants, and auxiliary (bi-lingual) teachers. Because each of 
these units had its own special interests, separate negotiations were conducted for 
each of them. This Article has considered only the classroom teacher unit. 
1064 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:10!1!1 
insistence on using preparation periods and after-school time for 
training new teachers. The negotiators devised a new sick-leave plan 
under which a physician's certificate was required only after ten 
days absence for illness in any school year, as contrasted with the 
previous four-day limit. Nonteaching "professional" periods in the 
secondary schools were to be used at the teacher's discretion, but 
with certain exceptions. 
The Board salvaged its position on the disruptive pupil when the 
Union agreed that the specific procedures both sides had worked out 
in the negotiations be drawn up as a "Special Circular" of the Board 
to be appended to, but not made part of, the contract. The special 
procedures agreed upon granted the teacher the right to initiate a 
complaint regarding a "disruptive" student with the principal of his 
school. Thereafter, the teacher could appeal unsatisfactory action to 
successively higher levels of administrative authority and to a spe-
cially constituted panel of Union, Board, and community represen-
tatives. But the final disposition of the case was to be made by the 
Superintendent of Schools. At the same time, however, the Board 
committed itself by way of a specific undertaking in the agreement 
not to change the procedures or policies set forth in the Special Cir-
cular without the consent of the Union. The Board also agreed that 
the circular would be subject to the grievance procedure and to ar-
bitration only for the purpose of resolving complaints of failure to 
comply with the procedures prescribed in the circular-not to re-
view the substance of a decision as to any individual pupil. 
The parties resolved the MES issue by incorporating three para-
graphs in the Preamble of the agreement. Essentially, these paragraphs 
declared that the Board would continue various specified intensive 
experimental programs for educational excellence, including MES, 
and that it would set aside a fund of 10 million dollars for the 1968-
1969 school year "for the purpose of making further progress in the 
development of new programs for the elementary schools."76 More-
over, a work group headed by an outside eminent educator selected 
by the Superintendent and composed of representatives of both sides 
and of parent or community groups would make recommendations 
to the Board and the Superintendent of Schools for the utilization 
of the special fund. However, not less than half the fund was to be 
used by the Board "for intensive programs for the reorganization 
and improvement of additional schools."77 
76. 1967-1969 Agreement, supra note 12. 
77. Id. 
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On this basis the Union and the Board concluded the final agree-
ment, and the teachers returned to their classrooms on Septem-
ber 29 for the commencement of the 1967-1968 school year. The 
parties and the public then settled down to what they expected to 
be a two-year period of quiet enjoyment of the fruits of the bargain-
ing and the new phase of the bargaining relationship. As is well 
known, however, before that first year was over, warning signals 
were up for the most serious crisis in the history of the school system 
and the city community. That account must be left to another 
kind of chronicle or perhaps to the next chapter of this history, to 
be written when the fifth collective bargaining agreement has been 
concluded. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The history of collective bargaining between the New York City 
Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers has 
brought into sharp focus the special problems inherent in any effort 
to adapt established industrial relations models to the public edu-
cation enterprise. These problems are compounded when that enter-
prise is a vast urban school system comprised of large numbers of 
children in need of intensive instructional services. Essentially, two 
main types of problems and their attendant dilemmas have charac-
terized this particular bargaining history: problems arising out of 
demands for so-called "bread and butter" economic items of pri-
mary benefit to the teachers-including salaries, fringe benefits, and 
improved working conditions; and problems arising out of demands 
for bilateral formulation of policies and standards relating directly 
to the education of children-ranging all the way from teacher qual-
ifications for particular assignments, to placement of difficult chil-
dren, to the expenditure of Board funds for experimental educa-
tional programs. 78 
The dilemma presented by the first type of problem has been 
how to satisfy teachers' demands for increased salaries while at the 
same time meeting other educational and operating school system 
needs within budgetary limitations. The solution has often necessi-
tated the reordering of priorities and the diversion of funds in-
tended for other important educational services to teachers' salaries. 
While such a course may serve well the expediency of the moment, it 
78, See generally Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 
67 MICH. L. REY. 1017 (1969). 
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places a progressively heavy strain on the Board's ability to fulfill its 
fundamental commitment to educational improvement. 
The dilemma presented by the second type of problem has been 
how to retain in the Board the essential aspects of its public trust 
and mission to serve the legitimate interests of the community, 
while at the same time satisfying the Union's demands in order to 
avoid a deferred commencement of the school year. In this area, 
the solutions have been altogether pragmatic, dictated by the relative 
force of countervailing pressures at the moment. The result has been 
a progressive expansion of the process of joint decision-making to the 
point where the Union enjoys equal status with the Board in the 
formulation of those aspects of educational management having any 
impact, however slight, on teacher welfare or Union prestige. This 
has been the outcome even as to policy matters plainly outside the 
realm of collective bargaining; as to these matters, there has often 
been full bilateral negotiation and agreement even though the final 
accord has not actually been incorporated within the physical frame-
work of the contract. 
The emergence of these significant characteristics of the relation-
ship between the Board and the Union raises two questions of over-
riding importance: (1) whether government as an employer can pro-
tect its exclusive policy terrain against invasion by the collective bar-
gaining process once that process has been set in motion by a power-
ful employee representative; and (2) whether the resolution of public-
interest issues in serious collective bargaining clashes can in fact be 
guided by the just and proper needs of the public and the commu-
nity. These are challenges not only for the New York City Board of 
Education, but also for governmental employers generally-particu-
larly those entrusted with functions in an area of great social con-
cern. 
